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. I STATE IJF UTAH , 
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CHAEL JONES , 
Case No. 17476 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty of Forgery in 
the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State 
fUtah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. 
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ttorney General 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:oz STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
. ~r -
";C~AEL JONES, 
Case No. 17476 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAFT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, MICHAEL JONES, was convicted in a criminal 
1rcceeding of Forgery, a second degree felony, by the court in the 
·~:rd Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
ccnorable l-!omer F. Wilkinson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Michael Jones was tried and convicted by a jury of 
'o:gery, a second degree felony. The appellant was sentenced for 
::,e indeterminate term of not less than one year, nor more than 
'.if teen years in prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by 
:~e Court below and a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State produced the following evidence to suppo,· 
a forgery conviction under U.C.A. §76-6-501, (1953 as amendec) 
Mr. Vargecko, the bank manager, testified that 
February 4, 1980, a teller alerted him that Helen Stokes ws 
attempting to cash a S2, 250. 00 check drawn against the account: 
Angelo Fuoco, another bank official. He was familiar with Mr. 
Fuoco' s signature and immediately recognized a problem with thE 
check. He invited Ms. Stokes into his office where he quest:i:, 
While delaying, he was informed that the check was stolen and 
telephoned Mr. Fuoco. Mr. Var gecko testified that, during this 
time, he noticed the defendant sitting on a bench near the ban'· I 
entrance. He saw the defendant enter the bank a few minutes lie: 1 
conduct a transaction at a window, and leave just as two police: 
(Officer's English and Rickelrnan) were arriving. He spoke wit:, 
the police and witnessed the subsequent arrest of Ms. Stokes ir.' 
the defendant. 
Mr. Fuoco testified that the check was one of eight 
were missing from the glove compartment of his car. The car hai 
been serviced the previous Friday, Fe~r.uaryl, at the bank'sparL· 
terrace garage. He called the police to go to the bank on Febr;t 
4 after being called by Mr. Vargecko. 
Mr. Shephard, the garage manager testified that the 
defendant serviced and parked Mr. Fuoco' s car on February 1, a~c 
that he noticed Ms. Stokes visiting the defendant that morning': 
b h f d · d On February 4, he was called r: his jo -site, as s, e o ten i . 
arrivinc the bank and got there just as the two policemen were 0 
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., ~ciced the defendant outside the bank, identified Ms. Stokes 
,,;de the bank, and told the police that he thought they were 
-ec~er. thus causing the defendant to be apprehended and arrested. 
Officer Snglish testified that he and Rockelman entered 
:~e 'Jank and found Ms. Stokes in Var gecko's custody. Rockelman 
~e'.t to locate the defendant, and English arrested Ms. Stokes. He 
,~ 50 arrested the defendant when R.ockelman returned with him. A 
,,irch by Rockelman, witnessed by English produced money and a check 
:~ ~efendant' s person. Officer English testified that defendant 
~itially denied knowledge, then admitted that his girlfriend, Ms. 
o'.)kes had given him the check and cash, but denied any 
1: the bank. 
wrongdoing 
Officer Yontz testified that he assisted the other two 
J'.'.icers by transporting Ms. Stokes to the Detention Center. As 
\e and Ms. Stokes were leaving the bank area, they passed close 
\y the defendant, who was in the custody of English and Rockelman. 
1£ficer Yontz testified that he overheard a conversation between 
'
1s. Stokes and defendant where defendant said to Ms. Stokes, "I 
.ove you anY',vay, even if you screwed it up." 
Defendant called Helen Stokes who testified that she took 
'.)e checks from Fuoco' s car on February 1 and filled them out 
:;ithout defendant's knowledge. She also placed one in his wallet. 
o~e did not inform him as to their true nature, nor the true nature 
J'. ~er business at the bank on February 4 until after they had been 
ir~ested. She testified that defendant told her to tell the truth 
111 that he said "he loves me even though I did screw up·" She 
'~itted giving him the cash at noon prior to their going to the 
·d. She testified to being convicted in Juvenile Court and paying 
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restitution. 
Mr. Fuoco was recalled and testified regarding t:Ce 
particulars of his car. 
Officer English added testimony concerni::ig statemen:; :i 
by Ms. Stokes at the bank. I 
Officer Yontz testified that he heard Ms. Stokes sa,, 
"I tried to get it right." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS nJSUFFICE:~TL TO SUPPORT THE V'i:RDIC7. 1 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficien:: 
support the verdict and that it would be unconscionable for tb 
Court to refuse review of his conviction. 
The authority of the reviewing Court to reverse a judr 
on sufficiency of evidence is clear. The standard for determir:'.:.: 
sufficiency of evidence for a conviction is that: 
It must appear that upon so viewing the evidence, 
reasonable minds must necesarily entertain a reasonable doubt::;: 
the defendant committed a crime. State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66,; 
(1977). 
In. State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975), this court'; 
discussed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 
conviction, it must appear that viewing the 
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn upon therefrom, in light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds 
could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 530 P.2d at 1272. 
-4-
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In State v. Garcia, 114.2d 167, 335 P.2d 57 (1960), this 
::;<:t stated that: 
There is no jury question without substantial 
evidence indicating defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonab~e doubt. This requires evidence from 
which a Jury could reasonaoly find the defendant 
guilty of all material issues of fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 355 P.2d at 59. 
In State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764, (1949) 
:~e court said that: 
We do not ordinarily interfere with the rulings 
of the trial court in either granting or denvin~ 
a new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure'to 0 
exercise discretion on the part of the trial judge 
is quite clearly show, the ruling of the trial 
judge will be sustained. 201 P.2d at 770. 
While in Appellants case there was no motion for a new 
::ial, the above language would seem to indicate when this court 
~11 grant a new trial, even in the absence of such a motion. Clearly 
'.}en, each case must turn upon its own facts as to whether a new 
'.rial is merited due to insufficiency of evidence. 
In Appellants case, there is no substantial evidence that 
defendant participated in, nor had any knowledge of the forgery. 
T~ere is no clear evidence that defendant took the checks from the 
2ar. There is no evidence that he wrote them out. He did not 
attempt to pass them. He entered the bank only to conduct a 
legitimate transaction. There is no evidence that he fled because 
:~e police arrived. He did not resist questioning by police. 
'ie admitted the cash and check came from Ms. Stokes as sub-
stantiated by her testimony. The confusion surrounding the 
i?orehension and arrest of Ms. Stokes and the defendant made it 
!..::Jrobable that the sequence of events were accurately reconstructed. 
-5-
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The conversation overheard by Officer Yontz h was not eard by 1 
other State's witness even though some were very nearby. The:, 
is reasonable doubt as to the exact wording and interpretat:o:. 
be given it. i 
The State was able to show only that both d f d I 
. e en ar.t :· 1 
Stokes had access to Fuoco's car. The defendant was seen sit:--
outside the bank, then conducting legitimate business insNe. 
Stokes had passed bad checks previous to this effort. The s~a:; 
merely established that the defendant knew and associated ·.<it': 
forgerer who trusted him. 
1 
Defendant presented evidence that Helen Stokes was:'.; I 
I 
person who took the checks and acted alone in forging them. Tai:·' 
the totality of evidence including the testimony of Ms. Stokes, 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether defendant was gu:l:· 
material issues of fact, as to whether defendant committed a c 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED PREJU:T)ICIAL :":RROR 
IN ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR TO EMPLOY AN 
IMPROPER METHOD DURING CLOSING ARGUME!lT. 
In Walker v. State of Utah, no. 16705 (Feb. 1981), th: 
court reiterated the general policy that the State, while charie: 
vigorously enforcing the laws: 
"Has a duty to not only secure appropriate 
convictions, but an even higher duty to see 
that ~ustice is done. In his role as the 
State s representative in criminal matters, 
the prosecutor, therefore, must see that 
justice is done. Thus, while he.shoul~ 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it 
is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one. No. 16705 at 5. 
made tr:e During her closing argument, the prosecutor 
following remarks: 
-6-
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"Officer Yontz is sure of what he heard" ... (Tr 123 
line 25). 
"Well it's a big mistake making a statement like 
that in front of any police officer, but it~ an 
expecially big mistake to make a statement like 
that in front of Officer Yontz. Officer Yontz 
is a second year law student and he is trained to 
know the significance of statements like that. 
He in prints it in his mind, writes it down, and then 
he writes it down in his report exactly as it was 
said". . . (Tr. 124, lines 4-11) . 
"She insinuated that Officer Yontz, a second year law 
student put something false in his report. She sug-
gested that he would risk one to five years in 
prison" . . . (Tr 141, line 8-10). 
At this point defense counsel objected to the intro-
iuction of remarks about penalties for something which did not 
occur in court as being improper rebuttal argument. The Court 
remarked: "let's stay off of anything as far as the penalty is 
concerned." (Tr. 141, lines 15,16). 
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's remarks were 
an improper bolstering of Officer Yontz's credibility and that 
the court failed to adequately correct the prejudicial error. 
It is well settled that prejudice· may result due to 
the impropriety of statements by counsel arguing a witnesses 
credibility from his official position or occupation or counsel's 
personal acquaintance with the witness for some stated dur-
ation of time. This is regularly construed as reversible error 
)ecause it is tantamount to being unsworn testimony by counsel. 
3l ALR 2d § 1240-1253. 
Here, Prosecutor Strachan and Officer Yontz are both 
~embers of the University of Utah's College of Law, she as a 
faculty member(then on sabbatieal leave,) he as a student in his 
second year. The prosecutor used her official position and this 
-7-
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relationship to bolster Yontz' s crucial testimony by suggescb, 
that law students are extra perceptive and alert, ciore aware 
significant statements than non-law student policemen, and 
possessing enhanced presence of mind for attending to minute 
details. This was tantamount to the prosecutor testifying as 
to what she believes to be the capacity of law-students from ~e: 
occupation as a law professor. 
The appellant urges this Court to grant a reversal 
based on t'."le test set out in State v. Valdez, 30 U.2d 54,60, 
513 P. 2d 422, (1973). In Valdez this Court held that: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a 
criminal case is, did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict and were they, under the circumstances 
of the particular case probably influenced by 
those remarks. 513 P.2d at 426. 
The first prong of the Valdez test, "calling to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justifiec 
in considering" was violated when the prosecutor suggested that 
Officer Yontz was extra-competent and perfectly correct, and 
would not risk a perjury conviction, due to his legal training 
The second prong of the Valdez test, "the jury was 
probably influenced by those remarks" is met inferentially 
since Yontz' s testimony was crucial and distinguisable by the 
exacting nature of the conversation that he alone overheud. 
indicated that the jury was probably influenced. This, taken 
with the prosecutor's clearly prejudicial remarks implore t~ 
finding that a different verdict might have been reached about 
remarks. 
-8-
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In State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (1977) this court 
;:a::ed that: 
On appeal, where there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether error was prejudicial, the doubt shall be 
resolved in favor of the defendant ... if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there may have been a different result, then the 
error should not be regarded as harmless. 569 P.2d 
at 1116. 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977) the court 
;aid that it: 
does not interfere with a jury verdict because of 
error or irregularity unless upon review of the 
entire record it is determined that prejudice 
occured in a substantial manner, i.e., the error 
must be such that there exists a reasonable 
probability or likelihood that there would have 
been a result more favorable to the defendant in 
absence of the error. 572 P.2d at 1352. 
Established Utah law clearly directs that any reason-
able doubt should favor the defendant. The potential effect 
of the prosecutor's prejudicial remarks in this case creates 
c:iat reasonable doubt. 
Consider these findings: 
In McGhee v. State, 274 Ala. 373, 149 So. 2d l. (1962) 
'3tatement by the prosecutor regarding the testimony of a clergy-
illan warranted reversal of a robbery conviction. The prosecutor 
said that he knew this man of God told the truth, that he is on 
God's side, and God is on his side. 
In Woodward v. Texas, 368 SW 2d 623 (1963) where the 
~osecutor was bolstering the credibility of a police officer 
witness during closing argument, arguing to the jury that if it could 
1 00 t believe the witness whose salary they were indirectly paying, 
·:cc co•ild it believe. Also that the prosecutor had a little better 
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faith in the police officer than that. The Court erred in per-
ting that argument over objection. That Court cited :fomaci,. 
----.::....:_ 
State, 267 SW 2d 140, where the conviction was reversed becaJs, 
the prosecutor described the police officer witnesses as fine 
citizens and fine men. Also Bro-vm v. State 309 SW 2d 452, 
where the conviction was reversed because the prosecutor argue: 
that the officers were the most courteous and truthful men 
in the enforcement of the law. 
In Ray v. State, 510 F2d 1395 (1973) the prosecutor 
argued that defendant's witnesses were not worthy of belief and 
stated that "if defendant is found not guilty by you now and 
later witnesses who have lied are charged with the crime of 
perjury and convicted; we can never come back and try this mar. 
again for this crime." The Court said the argument was highly 
improper and should have been stopped by the trial judge and :t' 
jury ins trued to disregard it. The Court said that al though cc~ 
in closing arguments may comment upon the evidence in the case 
and logical inferences therefrom, he may not inject his persona: 
opinion and beliefs, nor may he speculate as to future criminal 
proceedings, nor state that witnesses have committed perjury abs 
and judgment of perjury. 
Appellant contends that the prosecutor committed a 
similar prejudicial act of misconduct. The pr_os;e_cu_t:_or in effect 
testified that Officer Yontz was infallible. Those statements, 
coupled with the statement about Yontz not risking perjury were 
highly improper and the trial judge should have advised the jur·: 
to disregard them. 
-10-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUBMITTIJ.~G THE 
PROPER CAUTIO~ARY I:~STRUCTIO'.'l TO THE JURY 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it 
00bmitted Instruction ~fo, 20 1 without adding the proper 
cautionary language submitted in defense counsel's Instruction 
:lo, 42, This omission was improper because the bulk of evidence 
;gainst the defendant is circumstantial, The jury should be 
~ue that a reasonable alternative explanation of the cir-
(~stances is sufficient to preclude the lack of reasonable 
doubt needed to convict on circumstantial evidence. Appellant 
nas shown that a reasonable alternative explanation exists and 
:~t defense counsel Instruction No. 4 provided for that 
?Ossibility. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, that the trial court 
erred in allowing an adverse judgment against the defendant based 
L You are instructed that the mere presence of the defendant 
at the scene of the crime is not evidence of his guilt in 
~nd of itself, In order to find the defendant guilty you must 
rind, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has the 
appropriate mental state and acted in violation of the law. 
2. You are instructed that the mere presence of the defendant 
ac the scene of the crime is not evidence of his guilt in and of 
itself, In order to find the defendant guilty you must find, 
ievond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, had the appropriate 
~ntal state, and acted i~ violation of the provisions of the law 
~ather than merely being present or acquiesing in. cond':1ct or 
.ncumstances that miO'ht otherwise constitute a violation of the 
~2.W, o 
-11-
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on insufficient evidence, prejudicial prosecutorial mis-
conduct, and insufficient jury instructions, the defendant 
respectfully requests that the judgment should therefore 
be reversed. 
DATED this ~day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G.~I 
Attorney for Appellant ', 
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